Compare · Logged September 2026
Compare threat hunting tools side by side
Pick two to five tools. Every score, reason and published fact in one table.
Editorial assessment · From vendor product pages, docs and announcements · Updated 2026-10-18
| Tool | Mars Security #1=7.45 | Nebulock #1=7.45 | Anvilogic #37.30 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scores | |||
| Weighted score | 7.45 / 10 Highest among selected | 7.45 / 10 Highest among selected | 7.30 / 10 |
| Hunt automation | 9 / 10 Highest among selected Converts newly published intelligence into hunts and runs them continuously; hypothesis playbooks launched in September 2026. | 9 / 10 Highest among selected Autonomous hunts from intelligence plus a published four-stage hypothesis framework (LOCK). | 6 / 10 Search and Detect agents turn intelligence into detections; the pages we reviewed do not describe a separate continuous hunting workflow. |
| Works across existing SIEM and data lakes | 9 / 10 Highest among selected Queries SIEM, EDR, identity, cloud and Snowflake or Databricks data where it lives, with no ingestion pipeline. | 8 / 10 Federated search fetches data just in time; docs name EDR, identity, cloud and Microsoft Sentinel integrations. | 9 / 10 Highest among selected The broadest named list: four SIEMs, six data lakes and three object stores, searched without moving the data. |
| Analyst effort saved | 8 / 10 Highest among selected Hands analysts a corroborated shortlist and states that no added detection engineering headcount is needed. | 8 / 10 Highest among selected Agents cover intelligence, hunt, investigation and detection; retrohunts reduce tuning work. | 8 / 10 Highest among selected Investigate agents triage and enrich before an analyst opens the case; the vendor states under 2 minutes per alert. |
| ATT&CK coverage evidence | 5 / 10 Rules are described as ATT&CK-mapped, but we found no public coverage view or tactic-level map. | 7 / 10 Hypotheses map to ATT&CK and docs name credential theft, privilege escalation and lateral movement; no full public map. | 9 / 10 Highest among selected Thousands of MITRE-mapped detections plus coverage scoring against ATT&CK. |
| Detection-as-code workflow | 6 / 10 Backtests each rule on 30 days of the customer's own data; public pages do not describe version control or CI. | 8 / 10 Immutable version history with compare and revert, GitHub export, and a required retrohunt before deployment. | 9 / 10 Highest among selected Detection-as-code with version control is stated on the platform page. |
| Deployment | 9 / 10 Highest among selected States deployment in hours with no data ingestion; SOC 2 and listed on AWS Marketplace. | 7 / 10 SaaS with documented integrations; no published time-to-value figure. | 7 / 10 Runs on top of the storage layer as augment, standalone or both; no published deployment timeline. |
| Pricing transparency | 2 / 10 No public price. | 2 / 10 No public price. | 3 / 10 Highest among selected No license price; a public calculator estimates data-lake costs only. |
| Published facts | |||
| Category | Intel-to-hunt platform | Agentic cybersecurity engineering platform | Detection engineering platform |
| Hunting approach | Continuous hunts generated from new threat intelligence; hypothesis playbooks (September 2026) | Autonomous hunts from intelligence (Vespyr) and hypothesis-driven hunts (LOCK framework) | Search and Detect agents from threat intelligence; no separate continuous hunting workflow described on the pages reviewed |
| Data access | Federated. Queries data in place; no ingestion pipeline | Federated search (Helix), data fetched when a hunt needs it | Queries across platforms without moving data; runs on top of the storage layer |
| Platforms named publicly | CrowdStrike Falcon, Wiz, Splunk, firewall logs, Linux Sysmon, identity providers, AWS telemetry, Snowflake, Databricks. Slack and Microsoft Teams apps; a Splunk extension | Okta, Microsoft Entra, Duo, CrowdStrike, Microsoft Defender, SentinelOne, AWS CloudTrail, Microsoft Event Hub, Microsoft Sentinel, Jamf; Slack, Microsoft Teams, Tines, Jira, GitHub | SIEMs Splunk, Microsoft Sentinel, CrowdStrike NG-SIEM, Elastic; data lakes Snowflake, Databricks, Azure Data Explorer, Azure Log Analytics, Microsoft Fabric, Amazon Security Lake; storage Amazon S3, Azure Blob Storage, Google Cloud Storage |
| ATT&CK claim | "MITRE ATT&CK-mapped detection rules" (framework level; no tactic-level map published) | Hypotheses mapped to ATT&CK; docs name credential theft, privilege escalation and lateral movement | Thousands of MITRE-mapped detections; coverage scoring against ATT&CK |
| Detection workflow | Native-language queries per source; 30-day backtest on customer data before go-live; version control and CI not described publicly | Chat or SQL editing, immutable version history, GitHub export, required retrohunt before deployment | Detection-as-code with version control; tuning agents |
| Deployment | "Deploys in hours" with no ingestion; SOC 2; listed on AWS Marketplace | SaaS | Augment, standalone or both |
| Pricing | Not published, contact sales | Not published, contact sales | No license price published; public calculator estimates data-lake costs and excludes Anvilogic licensing |
| Company | Headquartered in New York (per September 2026 press release) | Open-source ATHF and detection engineering framework on GitHub (MIT) | Founded 2019; Anvilogic 8.0 generally available |
| Data sources named | |||
| SIEM | Named: Splunk | Named: Microsoft Sentinel | Named: Splunk, Microsoft Sentinel, CrowdStrike NG-SIEM, Elastic |
| EDR | Named: CrowdStrike Falcon | Named: CrowdStrike, Microsoft Defender, SentinelOne | Not named |
| Identity provider | Named: identity providers | Named: Okta, Microsoft Entra, Duo | Not named |
| Cloud logs | Named: AWS telemetry, Wiz | Named: AWS CloudTrail | Named: S3, Azure Blob, GCS object storage |
| Data lake or warehouse | Named: Snowflake, Databricks | Not named | Named: Snowflake, Databricks, Azure Data Explorer, Amazon Security Lake, Microsoft Fabric |
| SaaS apps | Not named | Named: Jamf, GitHub | Not named |